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REDISTRICTING IN NORTH CAROLINA-A
PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE
ROBINSON 0. EVERETr*

In 1992, when I filed a lawsuit attacking North Carolina's recently
enacted congressionalredistrictingplan, my premise was that drawing
a plan for a racially-definedpurpose violates equal protection and for
1 Having now argued four
this reason and others is unconstitutional.
appeals before the Supreme Court concerning North Carolina's
redistricting,I still believe in the correctness of my originalpremise;
but, in addition, I am concerned that districts drawn with a
predominantly racialpurpose tend to polarize our society, discourage
the formation of multiracialcoalitions, and, in the long run, to harm
even those they are intended to protect. I also have observed
subterfuges designed to mask the presence of a racial motive by
describing it as political. Because concealment of motive occurs
frequently and often can be readily undertaken, I-like many othershave become increasinglyskeptical that legislators can put aside racial
gerrymandering,and I am now persuaded that the best approachis to
create independent commissions to draw redistricting plans. This
Article seeks to provoke discussion of some of the issues posed by
racial gerrymandering and to challenge some views that I believe are
too readily accepted.
Gerrymandering refers to dividing a territorial area into electoral
districts that would give one political party an electoral majority in a
large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of
the opposition in as few districts created as possible. The term was
first used in 1812 while Elbridge Gerry was governor of
Massachusetts to describe an election district which resembled a
salamander. In their time, the British "rotten boroughs" were the
British counterpart of American gerrymanders?
* Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law; A.B., 1947, Harvard
University; J.D., 1950, Harvard University; L.L.M., 1959, Duke University School of Law.
1. Our complaint cited not only the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment but also the Fifteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution.
2. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 n.44 (1964) (discussing briefly the British
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Gerrymanders place the target voters where they will do the
greatest good or the least harm from the standpoint of those creating
the gerrymander. Computer technology has now made it easier to
identify the characteristics of voters and to place in the same district
voters who share the same characteristics-whether race, ethnicity,
income, or otherwise. For example, the 1990 census provided
extensive racial and other data for census blocks, which often are no
greater than a city block in size. In turn, the census blocks and
precincts containing them can be readily rearranged to form new
legislative and congressional districts, which can be easily displayed
on a computer screen. Moreover, as a district changes on the screen,
the person drawing the district is made aware immediately of the
percentage of the district's population that will be of any race or be
registered in any particular party.3
Some state constitutions and statutes contain requirements
intended to limit gerrymandering and the creation of dysfunctional
legislative and congressional districts. 4 However, typically any
political or legal remedies are inadequate to enforce such
requirements.' Also, it remains unclear who has standing to invoke
whatever remedies may exist. Moreover, legislators elected under an
existing redistricting plan often see little need to change that plan.6
Consequently, despite increased urbanization of many states during
experience eliminating "rotten boroughs").
3. See Brief on the Merits for Appellees at 22, Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)
(No. 94-923, No. 94-924).
4. These requirements are more frequently provided for state legislative districts
than for congressional districts. Sometimes "contiguousness" is required; this term refers
to districts of which there is no part that does not touch another part of the district.
However, a question may arise as to whether this requirement is satisfied by "point
contiguity," where parts of a district meet at an imaginary point. For example, in North
Carolina's 1992 redistricting plan, the northern and southern parts of the First District
came together at the same point as the eastern and western parts of the Third District.
"Compactness" is generally thought of as "geographical compactness," of which there are
at least two measures. However, in the North Carolina redistricting litigation some of the
parties also advanced a concept of "functional compactness."
5. For example, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,553-54 (1964), the Court noted:
No effective political remedy to obtain relief against the alleged
malapportionment of the Alabama Legislature appears to have been available.
No initiative procedure exists under Alabama law. Amendment of the State
Constitution can be achieved only after a proposal is adopted by three-fifths of
the members of both houses of the legislature and is approved by a majority of
the people, or as a result of a constitutional convention convened after approval
by the people of a convention call initiated by a majority of both houses of the
Alabama Legislature.
6. They could rationalize that as elected representatives of the voters they had been
entrusted by the voters with the duty of drawing district boundaries as they believed
wise-regardless of any personal interest they might have in the outcome.
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the first part of the last century, districts differing greatly in
population continued to elect the same number of legislators and the
practical value of a city dweller's vote diminished in relation to the
value of a farmer's vote.
Colegrove v. Green, which concerned congressional districts in
Illinois, provides a good example of the difficulty in obtaining
change. 7 The plaintiffs complained that because of changes in
population, the districts--drawn by the legislature forty-five years
equality of
and approximate
earlier-lacked compactness
8
wrote that
Frankfurter
In denying relief, Justice
population.
"[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy for
unfairness in districting, is to secure state legislatures that will
apportion properly or to invoke the ample powers of Congress." 9
Despite Colegrove, groups that had their core strength in the
cities continued to push for changes that could provide urban dwellers
greater voting power. In 1961, in Baker v. Carr, Tennessee voters
challenged the districts that were used in electing members of the
general assembly.10 The plaintiffs alleged that subsequent to the 1901
statute, which created the districts, substantial growth and
redistribution of Tennessee's population had occurred but the
legislature had arbitrarily and capriciously failed to enact a
reapportionment plan to take account of these changes." As a result,
these voters suffered "debasement of their vote" and were thereby
denied equal protection. 12 In dismissing the complaint on the basis of
nonjusticiability under Article Ill of the Constitution, the district
court noted that the "matter is considered unsuited to judicial inquiry
or adjustment."' 3 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.' 4
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted appellants'
argument that, despite the "shifted and enlarged voting population"
that had occurred since the 1901 reapportionment statute, the
composition of the legislature made it difficult or impossible to obtain

7. 328 U.S. 549,550 (1946).
8. Id. at 550-51.
9. Id. at 556. However, resort to Congress would not be very helpful if
reapportionment of a legislature was involved, rather than congressional districts.
10. 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962).
11. Id. at 192-93.
12. Id. at 193-94.
13. Id. at 196.
14. Id. at 237. There, Charles Rhyne, a former president of the American Bar
Association, argued the case for the voter appellants and also joined in filing an amicus
brief for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. Solicitor General Archibald
Cox argued as an amicus in support of the appellants.
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reapportionment. 15 In rejecting the district court's view as to
nonjusticiability, the Court outlined several factors bearing on
justiciability, including the "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" the issue.16 Justice Brennan
then concluded that the Court had jurisdiction over the cause of
action.'7 The Court also upheld the standing of the complaining
voters. Predictably, Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justice
Harlan. In retrospect, the application of equal protection to
redistricting had an incredible effect on the political map of the

United States and Baker was clearly one of the most important
decisions of the last century.
Two years later,, the Supreme Court relied on Baker to invalidate
Alabama's apportionment of its state legislature due to Alabama's
significant departure from the "one person, one vote" standard and
the resulting violation of equal protection. In Reynolds v. Sims,18 the
Court made clear that states will be allowed more flexibility in
creating legislative districts than in drawing congressional districts. 19
The Court noted, however, that the Alabama legislative
apportionment "presented little more than crazy quilts, completely
lacking in rationality, and could be found invalid on that basis
alone."'2 This comment seems to intimate that irrational boundaries
of a legislative district may offend equal protection.
Soon after Reynolds was decided, Renn Drum, a recent Wake
Forest Law School graduate, initiated a federal lawsuit to require that
North Carolina redistrict itself in accord with the "one person, one
15. Id. at 192-93.
16. Id. at 217. Justice Brennan's discussion of justiciability and the political question
has often been cited in later cases as controlling authority. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemere,
478 U.S. 109, 121-26 (1986) (discussing the political question doctrine).
17. 328 U.S. at 228-29. In support of its position the Court also cited its recent
decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), where the Fifteenth Amendment
was applied to strike down a redrawing of the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee,
Alabama. The state legislature had created a twenty-eight sided district boundary to
exclude practically all blacks and thereby deprive them of the right to vote in municipal
elections. Id. at 341.
18. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19. See id. at 577-78 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding Georgia
congressional redistricting unconstitutional because of population variances)).
In
Wesberry, the Supreme Court decided that "construed in its historical context, the
command of Article I, § 2 that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several
States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is
to be worth as much as another's." 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). In Reynolds, which relies on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated that "somewhat
more flexibility may therefore be constitutionally permissible with respect to state
legislative apportionment than in congressional districting." 377 U.S. at 571-81.
20. 377 U.S. at 569.
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vote" mandate.21 The result was the enactment of a new redistricting
plan by the North Carolina General Assembly. At the time, the
legislature was controlled by the Democrats, who in this plan
apparently had gerrymandered the Fourth Congressional District to
protect incumbent Representative Harold Cooley, one of North
Carolina's most senior members of Congress and the chair of an
important committee. Cooley was facing a likely challenge in the
Democratic primary from William A. Creech, who had been Chief
Counsel for Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights. Creech had always resided in Johnston County, which for
many years had been in the same district with Nash County, where
Cooley resided. The redistricting plan removed Johnston County
from the Fourth District and thereby created an obvious barrier to
Creech's candidacy. Because Creech and I were close friends, we
talked about challenging the gerrymander-which had produced a
district that was barely contiguous. Ultimately, along with another
attorney, I instituted an action to have the redistricting plan declared
unconstitutionalP
A hearing before a three-judge district court led to the decision
that the challenged Fourth Congressional District was so lacking in
compactness and contiguousness as to deny equal protection 4
However, because the May 1966 primaries were fast approaching, the
district court allowed the General Assembly to delay replacement of
the unconstitutional plan until the 1968 elections.' On appeal, the
Supreme Court summarily affirmed.6 This frustrating outcome has
been repeated in some other redistricting cases in North Carolina and
21. Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877,879 (M.D.N.C. 1965).
22. There was some question as to whether the Fourth District was contiguous,
because it was unclear that Nash and Wake Counties-which were both in the districthad any common boundary.
23. Among the several voters who joined as plaintiffs was Ruth 0. Shaw, a publicspirited Durham citizen who unwittingly was preparing herself to participate in precedentsetting litigation a quarter of a century later.
24. Drum v. Seawell, 250 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D.N.C. 1966); see also Drum v.
Seawell, 271 F. Supp. 193, 194 (M.D.N.C. 1967) (holding proposed redistricting plan
invalid but allowing state to hold election under unconstitutional redistricting plan).

25. Drum, 250 F. Supp. at 925.
26. Drum v. Seawell, 383 U.S. 831, 831 (1966) (per curiam). Creech changed his
voting registration to a county in the new district and immediately thereafter filed as a
candidate for Congress. He lost the nomination to Representative Cooley in the
Democratic primary and, in turn, Cooley lost in the general election to Republican Jim
Gardner, who thereby launched his political career. The net result of our efforts was to
invalidate an unconstitutional congressional district but only after significant damage had
occurred. Ironically, the Democratic legislature would probably have been more pleased
to have Creech elected to Congress than to have a Republican.
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elsewhere: A court decides that a legislature has violated the
Constitution by designing gerrymandered districts which violate equal
protection, but in deference to the legislature, the court allows the
unconstitutional plan to remain in effect until the next election
27
cycle.
In later years, some important developments occurred in election
m in
law. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Bandemer,
which the challenge was to the political gerrymander by which the
Republican Party had blocked Democrats from winning elective
office in Indiana. 9 In Davis, a majority recognized the possibility that
equal, protection would be violated by the establishment of
immutable legislative district lines that prevented a party out of
power from ever winning seats in the legislature. In denying relief to
the plaintiffs, however, the Court made clear that complying with the
prerequisites for successfully challenging a political gerrymander
would be almost impossible. 0
Another important development involved the Supreme Court's

recognition of a minority group's right to obtain a judicial remedy if,
under certain conditions, a state legislature failed to create a
majority-minority district.'
Finally, during this period the
Department of Justice employed with increasing vigor its
preclearance authority to deny approval of changes in voting
procedures and qualifications.32 In many instances, the state or
27. Thus, as will be discussed later in more detail, North Carolina's Twelfth
Congressional District was held unconstitutional in 1996, but nonetheless the legislature
was allowed to use that district in the 1996 elections. See infra notes 89-90 and
accompanying text.
28. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
29. Id. at 115.
30. Cf. id. at 143. The first successful challenge to a political gerrymander occurred
when North Carolina Republicans convinced a federal court that the Democratic Party's
dominance of the election of North Carolina Superior Court judges would continue until
judicial relief was granted. Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722,
733 (E.D.N.C. 1994), affd as modified, Republican Party of North Carolina v. North
Carolina Bd. of Elections, No-94-1057, 1994 WL 263955, at *1 (4th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam); see also Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 961 (4th Cir. 1992).
31. The leading case, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), arose in North
Carolina. The lower court awarded relief under the Voting Rights Act, which had been
enacted to prevent disenfranchisement and vote dilution of minority voters. Id. at 37-38.
Under Gingles, if minority groups could demonstrate that certain threshold conditions
existed, the creation of a minority-black district could be compelled. The three Gingles
conditions are: (1) a minority group "sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2) the minority group is "politically
cohesive"; and (3) "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id. at 50-51.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (1994) provides that certain states or political
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political subdivision involved would accede to the demands of 3the
expenses
civil rights division in order to avoid delay and litigation
THE NORTH CAROLINA 1992 REDISTRICrING PLAN

Because of the "one person, one vote" requirement and changes
in population, the results of the 1990 census required legislatures in
North Carolina and many other states to enact new redistricting
plans.34 In the summer of 1991, the North Carolina General
Assembly enacted a redistricting plan with a single majority-black
district.35 In December, 1991, this plan was denied preclearance by
the Civil Rights Division, which insisted on the creation of a second
majority-black district.36 The denial of preclearance was in accord
with the "maximization" policy then being followed by the
Department of Justice whereunder if a majority-minority district
37
could be created, the legislature had to do so. Whatever its merits,
this policy offered a possible advantage to the Republican Party. In
view of the overwhelming alignment of African Americans with the
Democratic Party,38 the "packing" of African Americans in majoritysubdivisions thereof shall not alter voting qualifications, prerequisites, standards,
practices, or procedures without either instituting an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to obtain a declaratory judgment that this alteration
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color" or securing preclearance from the Attorney General.
The states or political subdivisions subject to this requirement are those which
"maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device" and with respect to which less than
50% of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered to vote on November 1,
1964 or voted in the 1964 presidential election. Id. § 1973b(b). Under this standard, forty
North Carolina counties were subject to preclearance.
33. The litigation expenses might include those of minority groups attacking a
redistricting plan enacted by the state and later held to violate statutory requirements.
34. North Carolina was allocated an additional congressional seat because of an
increase in its population during the 1980s in relation to increases in some other states.
Also, much of the population growth in North Carolina was in the urbanized central area
rather than the more rural eastern and mountain regions.
35. Act of July 8, 1991, ch. 601, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1318, 1319-28 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-201 (1999)).
36. In connection with the subsequent redistricting litigation, Dennis Winner, who as
a state senator had chaired a redistricting committee, testified in a deposition that he had
been present at a meeting in December 1991 at which John Dunne, who headed the Civil
Rights Division, expressed the view that since twenty-two percent of North Carolina's
population was black, at least two of its twelve representatives in Congress should be
African American.
37. Some have referred to this policy as "if you can, you must."
38. In North Carolina's redistricting litigation experts estimated, without any
disagreement, that over ninety-five percent of the African Americans who registered and
voted in the state did so as Democrats. No one has pointed out any group of voters in
North Carolina as consistently Democratic as African Americans.
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minority districts inevitably resulted in a "bleaching" of other
districts-thereby increasing their percentage of Republicans 9

One possibility for a second majority-black district was that it
would run through the Piedmont region of the state from Charlotte to
Durham. 0 Another possibility was to create a district running from
Charlotte to Wilmington.4' Ultimately, because of the denial of
preclearance for the earlier plan, late in January 1992, the General
Assembly enacted a redistricting plan that contained two majorityblack districts.4' One of these districts-the First District-was in the
northeast part of the state but extended from Virginia almost to the
South Carolina border.4 3 The other-the Twelfth District-was in the
Piedmont area of the state and ran from Gastonia to Durham.'
By February 1992, the Republican Party in North Carolina must
have concluded that it had been out-maneuvered. The Democrats
had cleverly used racial demographic data from the 1990 census to
create these two majority-black districts-apparently without
endangering white Democratic incumbents in other districts.45

Therefore, Arthur Pope and some other Republican plaintiffs filed a
39. From a variety of sources, I have received the impression that the strong
encouragement of majority-minority districts by the Civil Rights Division was urged by
Benjamin Ginsberg, who was at one time counsel for the National Republican Party, and
by C. Allen Foster and Robert Hunter, who were prominent Republican attorneys in
Greensboro, N.C. Some have speculated that the 1994 change in control of the House of
Representatives may reflect the political cunning of these individuals because that change
resulted in part from the defeat of moderate white southern Democrats in Congress whose
districts had been changed incident to "maximization."
40. My understanding is that this alternative had apparently first been proposed by
David Balmer, a Republican legislator from Charlotte; and subsequently it was pursued by
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
41. This alternative probably would have been unsatisfactory to the Civil Rights
Division because although it would contain only a minority of whites, there would not
have been a majority of blacks due to the substantial population of Native Americans in
Robeson County.
42. Act of Jan. 24, 1992, ch. 7, 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws 77, 77-128 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-210 (1999)).
43. District One is somewhat hook-shaped and is centered in the northeast portion of
North Carolina from which it moves south until it tapers to a narrow band. Then, with
finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the state near the South
Carolina border. It has also been compared to a Rorschach ink-blot test and a bug
splattered on a windshield.
44. District Twelve is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no
wider than the 1-85 corridor. It winds in snake-like fashion through tobacco country,
financial centers, and manufacturing areas. The district divides all ten of the counties
through which it passes and at one point remains contiguous only because it intersects at a
single point with two other districts before crossing over them.
45. Subsequent events revealed that the Democrats may not have been as successful
as they may have believed.
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case in Federal District Court.4 6 They claimed the 1992 plan was an

unconstitutional political gerrymander; however, race was not alleged
to be a factor in any constitutional violation.
On the basis of later conversations with informed persons, it is
clear to me that the Republican attorneys attacking the North

Carolina gerrymander had been directed by the Republican National
Committee to stay away from any claim of racial-as distinguished
from political-gerrymandering. Had it been otherwise, the plaintiffs

would have been challenging indirectly the "maximization" policy
being enforced so vigorously by the Civil Rights Division of the then
Republican-controlled Department of Justice. In any event, the
district court quickly resolved the issues that had been raised by the
Republicans and the suit was dismissed. 47
In January 1992, after seeing a map of the two majority-black
districts that had been created, I was incredulous.

The districts

seemed to defy compactness and contiguousness requirements to
which the district court referred in 1966 when it held unconstitutional
the gerrymandered district I had contested.4 8 Upon inquiry, I learned
that these two districts had been drawn with a majority of African
Americans to ensure election of two African Americans to
Congress.49 This also concerned me because it seemed to fly in the
face of cases holding that race could not be the basis for peremptory
challenges in court trials.50 The rationale for those cases had been
46. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1992). Pope, a Raleigh resident
and attorney, has served in the General Assembly from time to time and was most
recently re-elected in November 2000. He has been active in introducing bills designed to
curtail gerrymandering.
47. Id. at 396.
48. Drum v. Seawell, 250 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D.N.C. 1966). Likewise, the two
districts seem to be "little more than crazy quilts, completely lacking in rationality, and
could be found invalid on that basis alone." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
The unnatural shape of the majority-black districts tended to distort adjacent districts.
49. At this time, there was no hesitancy on the part of the State in admitting the
purpose for creating these districts.
50. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court noted that the central concern of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to put an end to government discrimination based on race. 476 U.S. 79,
85 (1986). Later Supreme Court precedents have reaffirmed and extended Baston. See,
e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits not only racial discrimination but also gender discrimination in jury selection);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits criminal defendants from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges during jury selection); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 62829 (1991) (holding that private litigants in civil cases may not use racially based
peremptory challenges); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (holding that,
while race neutral jury selection is permissible, the trial court should make sure that an
attorney does not have a secret or forbidden intent when making a peremptory challenge);
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that equal protection precluded the use of race as the basis for the
governmental action involved in a court's allowance of a peremptory
challenge. It was hard to understand why this rationale, designed to
protect a citizen's right to serve on a jury without regard to race,
would not apply equally to a citizen's important right to vote and to
hold elective office without regard to race.
Shortly thereafter, I talked separately to several persons in
Durham who felt disenfranchised by the legislature's creation of the
Twelfth District and the racial gerrymandering of Durham County
and who wished to challenge this district."1 My own motivation for
initiating a court action to overturn the gerrymander was my firm
belief that use of data about the racial composition of census blocks in
the creation of congressional districts appeared to give governmental
approval to the use of racial stereotypes and racial quotas. The
implicit premise for such racial gerrymanders was that only an
African American could properly represent the interests of other
African Americans in the Congress or the state legislature and that all
African Americans were expected to vote in the same way. In my
view, this was racial stereotyping; the assumption that because
twenty-two percent of North Carolina's total population was African
American, a corresponding percent of its congressional delegation
should be black was the endorsement of a racial quota.
Moreover, I was unconvinced that creating majority-black
districts was the only means by which African Americans could be
elected to office. In Durham, where I reside, multi-racial coalitions
had been formed successfully. Thus, at various time during the 1990s,
a majority of Durham's County Commission and City Council
members were black even though the majority of the population is
white.
Additionally, the city of Durham-like Raleigh and
Charlotte-has elected a black mayor on at least one occasion.5 2
Much earlier, Howard Lee, an African American, became the first
black mayor elected in a majority-white town in the South, Chapel
Hill, N.C., and now is a state senator from a majority-white district.
Furthermore, my longtime association with the Armed Services-in
which racial integration to a considerable extent has been
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that one may raise an equal protection
challenge to jury selection regardless of one's race).
51. One such person was Professor Melvin G. Shimm, a Duke Law School colleague
of mine since the 1950s. Another was Ruth 0. Shaw, who participated in 1966 in attacking
the politically rigged gerrymander in favor of Congressman Cooley.
52. Clarence Lightner was mayor of Raleigh from December 1973 to November 1975.
Harvey Gantt was mayor of Charlotte from 1983 to 1987. Chester Jenkins was mayor of
Durham from November 1989 to December 1991.
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successful-produced optimism on my part as to the feasibility of
creating a "color-blind" society in the United States. Indeed, to me,
the majority-minority districts created in North Carolina-like those
elsewhere-have greater potential for harm than good because they
tend to deter the formation of multi-racial coalitions.
Although over the years I have been a loyal Democrat, 53 1 had no
However, had I
political motivation for initiating litigation.
approached the issue of racial gerrymandering from a partisan
standpoint and with the information I acquired later, I would have
been equally opposed to the creation of "bizarre" majority-black
districts because their ultimate effect was to polarize Congress by
making it more difficult for moderate white Democrats to be elected.
On March 12, 1992, four co-plaintiffs and I filed a complaint in
federal district court, wherein we named as defendants the Attorney
General and Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division
as well as the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of North Carolina,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of State,
and the Board of Elections. 4 Although all five plaintiffs were white,
we did not allege this fact in our complaint because we did not
consider it to be relevant. In our view, every voter regardless of his or
her race, was entitled to participate in an electoral process not based
on racial classification or quotas 5
All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, maintaining we
had stated no cause of action against federal or state defendants. A
prompt hearing led to an order dismissing all our claims. Our lawsuit
was probably being derided by many at the time, but it seemed clear
to us that some basic issues of equal protection had been raised.
Therefore, we went ahead with an appeal, and to our delight, we
learned on December 7, 1992, that probable jurisdiction had been
noted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Soon thereafter, a number of amicus curiae briefs were filed.
The Republican National Committee filed as an amicus on our side,

53. Some would have referred to me as a "yellow dog" Democrat-someone who
would vote for a "yellow dog" rather than a Republican.
54. See Shaw v. Barr, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C. filed Mar. 12, 1992). In
addition to Melvin Shimm and Ruth Shaw, my co-plaintiffs were my son, Greg Everett,
and my secretary, Dorothy Bullock. I was counsel for myself and the other plaintiffs and
received important pro bono assistance from a young Raleigh lawyer, Jeffrey Parsons.
55. In this connection our analogy was to Powers v. Ohio, which held that on equal
protection grounds one may attack race-based peremptory challenges in jury selection
regardless of the race of either the challenged juror or the person making the challenge.
499 U.S. 400, 402 (1999).
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and the Democratic National Committee filed against us. 5 6 The
Washington Legal Foundation and American Jewish Congress
supported our appeal-probably because of our professed adherence
to principles of nondiscrimination. Also, amicus briefs for appellees
were filed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, and others. These
amicus briefs were important in various ways. They alerted the Court
to the importance of the issues we were raising. Sometimes they
presented additional or alternative theories for reaching a particular
result or information that could ultimately prove helpful to the Court.
Certainly the presence of the amicus briefs made us appellants feel a
special responsibility to assure that we presented our arguments
against racial gerrymandering as persuasively as possible.
After oral argument on April 20, 1993, 57 the Court affirmed the
dismissal as to the federal defendants, but by a five-to-four vote, it
reversed the dismissal of our action as to the State defendants.58 Our
claim had rested on three arguments. The first was that Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection barred the intentional use of race to
draw majority-black districts that ignored traditional redistricting
principles. Specifically, our premise was that the Constitution did not
allow an electoral process in which voters-black or white-were
segregated explicitly or implicitly on the basis of race. The Court
ultimately ruled in our favor on this claim.
A second theory, derived from Gomillion v. Lightfoot,59 was that
voters placed inside or outside artificially constructed race-based
districts suffered an abridgement of their right to vote in violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Finally, we asserted that insofar as
congressional elections are concerned, the constitutional requirement
that a state's representatives in Congress be elected by the "people"
of the state does not permit those "people" to be arbitrarily divided
by racial gerrymandering. 60 The Court found no need to explore any
theory other than that of equal protection-which it accepted.
The Court's opinion referred to the "appearances" of the North
Carolina redistricting plan and, to make the point clearer, appended a
56. This alignment seemed somewhat incongruous to the plaintiffs, all of whom were
Democrats.
- 57. The most effective part of my oral argument was to call the Court's attention to
the bizarre shape of the Twelfth District as shown on a large map which we had lodged
with the Court.
58. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
59. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
60. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2. I am unaware of any precedents dealing directly with this
theory.
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map of the districts.6 1 Critics subsequently complained that the Court
was preoccupied with "aesthetics." Such criticism, however, ignores
the fact that "appearances" are important in revealing intent.
Furthermore, a district drawn in compliance with traditional
redistricting principles, such as compactness, contiguousness, and
conformity to the boundaries of cities, counties, and other political
subdivisions, is more likely to be "functional"-a district in which
voters are aware of the district in which they vote, representatives are
aware of whom they represent, and coalitions can be more readily
formed.
Subsequent events revealed the tactics that would be used later
in defending racial gerrymanders. For example, in the oral argument
on April 20, 1993, Professor Jefferson Powell, 62 who represented the
State appellees, commented that everyone knew why the 1992 North
Carolina redistricting plan had been created; 63 and, to me, his remarks
obviously implied that the plan was a racial gerrymander and that
such gerrymanders were permissible. However, when the Court
reversed the dismissal of our action as to the state officials and
remanded the case for trial, the State changed its position and argued
that the North Carolina gerrymander was not based on race. This
denial was hard to reconcile with the circumstance that the distorted
Twelfth District with its 55% black population was located in North
Carolina, where only 22% of the total population is African
Americans and where that 22% is "relatively dispersed."'
Another argument for evading the holding of Shaw v. Reno
focuses on avoiding interference with the prerogatives of state
legislators in performing their difficult task of redistricting.
According to this argument, if the federal courts involve themselves
with state redistricting, they should only do so when those who
61. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,658 (1996).

62. Professor Powell was a colleague of mine at Duke Law School; this may have been
the first time in the Supreme Court's history that two members of the same law faculty had
argued before it on opposites sides. On two later occasions in the North Carolina
redistricting legislation, my Duke Law colleague, Walter Dellinger, and I argued against
each other before the Supreme Court.
63. Powell asserted that the "General Assembly intentionally created two majorityminority congressional districts.... [T]he General Assembly did so for the purpose of
complying with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act and of securing preclearance of its
congressional reapportionment plan from the Attorney General of the United States."
Transcript, 1993 WL 751836, at *26 (U.S.Oral.Arg.), Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(No. 92-357). Subsequently, in responding to a question from the Court, he stated:
"There's no dispute here over what the State's purpose is. There's a dispute over how to
characterize it legally, but we're not in disagreement over what the State legislature was
trying to do." Id. at 38.
64. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 634.
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challenge the redistricting bear a very heavy burden of proof and
comply with an especially demanding standard. To a considerable
extent, the Supreme Court has accepted this argument by requiring
that those who attack a redistricting plan as being racially
gerrymandered must establish that race was the predominant motive
for the plan. This requirement imposes a significantly more rigorous
burden than that which usually applies in determining whether
unconstitutional racial discrimination has occurred in taking state
That requirement-stated in Arlington Heights v.
action.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation6 -demands only
that racial discrimination be one purpose underlying the state action,
rather than the predominant motive.
Because race must not only be a cause of the challenged
redistricting but also must be the predominant motive, some
legislators have defended their redistricting plans by claiming that
race either was not their chief motive or was not a motive at all. At
most, race was only "considered"-a term that those who defend
gerrymanders have sought to use as a shield against a factual finding
of a predominant race-based motive. 66
I do not understand why legislators should have more leeway to
utilize race in drawing district lines than in making other decisionsespecially in light of the legislators' self-interest in districting. It
seems appropriate that courts should not unduly hamper legislatures,
but this rationale should not entitle legislatures to trample on
constitutional rights. The right to vote is among the most precious
rights of citizenship. It deserves no less protection than is provided
other rights-such as the right to be a juror or to have equal access to
education and employment.
Hopefully, in the interest of consistency and fairness, the Court
someday will apply strict scrutiny more readily to racial
Unfortunately, just as with political
gerrymandering.
gerrymandering-where in Davis v. Bandemer, the Court recognized
a right but made it very difficult to vindicate that right-the Court
may choose to denounce racial gerrymandering but at the same time
may create unwarranted potential barriers against voters' obtaining
relief from such gerrymanders.
After we had appealed to the Supreme Court in 1992, I learned
that plaintiffs in other states had followed in our footsteps with
65. 429 U.S. 252,265-66 (1977).
66. In her separate concurring opinion in Miller v. Johnson, Justice O'Connor stated
that race may be "considered" in redistricting. 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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complaints that tracked our own.67 In late June 1993, we received the
welcome news of our victory in Shaw v. Reno. At that point, we
realized that we would be entering a new stage. In the hope that
some settlement might be reached, I requested a conference with
North Carolina's then Attorney General Mike Easley. When we met,
I primarily emphasized that, although we five white plaintiffs were all
Democrats, we had no racial or partisan agenda to pursue. Our goal
was simply to seek from the legislature the enactment of a raceneutral redistricting plan, and we believed this task could be readily
performed by a good-faith effort of everyone involved.
I heard nothing for several weeks thereafter until, while
attending a National Legislators Conference in San Diego, I learned
from Gerry Cohen, a staff member of the North Carolina General
Assembly," that on the previous day the legislature had adjourned
soon after appropriating $500,000 to defend the 1992 redistricting
plan at trial. Obviously, the battle would continue!
At this point I realized for the first time how significant a
financial burden we five plaintiffs-all private individuals not backed
by political groups-would have to carry in order to present our case
adequately to the district court. Large costs would be incurred during
discovery. Moreover, the absence of ample resources for hiring
experts would make it difficult to establish a racial gerrymander's
existence in the face of post hoc denials by legislators. Fortunately,
we encountered some highly motivated experts who did not wish to
be tarred by any suspicion that they were "hired guns" seeking to
receive expert witness fees or to profit in any other way from our
litigation.69
67. Thus, on a visit to Monroe, Louisiana, where one of my sons was teaching, I met a
solo practitioner, Paul Hurd, who had pending at the trial level a racial gerrymandering
case, eventually decided as U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), that was awaiting the
outcome of our appeal. We developed a close relationship and interchanged ideas and
information. Such interchanges with Hurd and others proved invaluable for us;
subsequently we were able to reciprocate some of the benefits we received. We became
increasingly aware that ours was a pivotal case that could have a profound effect on the
electoral process in the United States. This awareness enhanced our determination to
fight to the finish.
68. Cohen was the staff member who headed up bill drafting for the General
Assembly. He drafted the 1991 and 1992 redistricting plans and other redistricting plans
in 1997 and 1998.
69. For example, William 0. Keech, then a professor of political science at the
University of North Carolina, whom I asked to be an expert witness for us, said that he
would do so only on one condition. Upon inquiring anxiously as to that condition, I
welcomed the news that it was that he not be paid any expert witness fees. His interest
was only in obtaining justice! Similarly, Timothy O'Rourke, then a professor of Political
Science at Clemson University, decided to waive any witness fees and only obtain from us
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We soon discovered that political scientists had developed
objective standards to make it easier to establish whether
geographical compactness had been ignored in gerrymanders. With
the aid of such standards we could emphasize that far more than
"appearance" or "ugliness" was involved and that the legislature's
disregard of geographical compactness in drawing the "targeted"
districts revealed that the true legislative intent was predominantly
race-based. 0
Fortunately, when the NAACP intervened in the case on the

defendants' side, the Republican Party intervened on our side.7 ' This
action may have reflected a change in party leadership7' or perhaps a
conclusion by Republican leaders that whatever political gain might
accrue from the flagrant racial gerrymandering in the 1992
redistricting plan, their party in the long run would be subject to
complaints about promoting the use of race in the electoral process.
The Court had made clear in Shaw that the legislature's primary

motive could be established by direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence, or both.73 When the gerrymanders were being enacted
shortly before Shaw was decided, legislators were unaware of any
possibility that the Court would later recognize an "analytically
distinct" claim as to racial gerrymandering. 74 Therefore, in many
instances, they had acknowledged without hesitation a racial purpose
behind their redistricting. Moreover, those filing submissions to the

Department of Justice for preclearance from the Civil Rights Division
specifically asserted that the purpose was to elect black candidates by
reimbursement of actual expenses.
70. The two most accepted measures of compactness--"perimeter compactness" and
"dispersion compactness"-are explained in Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483,554-56 (1993).
71. The intervenors actually were persons sponsored by the organizations involved.
A question exists as to the standing required of organizations wishing to be a party to
Shaw-type litigation. In each instance the organizations provided access to valuable
witnesses. For example, once the Republicans had intervened on our side, Thomas
Hofeller, the leading Republican expert on redistricting, became available for consultation
and testimony. His experience made it easy for him either to construct a racial
gerrymander or to identify such a gerrymander created by others. His testimony was
important in establishing that race was the primary motive for the North Carolina
redistricting plan and that other explanations were spurious.
72. Benjamin L. Ginsberg, who reportedly had strongly supported a "maximization"
policy for majority-minority districts, had been replaced by Michael A. Hess as counsel for
the Republican Party.
73. 509 U.S. 630, 646-47; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)
(describing plaintiffs' burden of showing motive either by direct or circumstantial
evidence).
74. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 632.
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designing majority-black districts. Subsequently, these legislative
statements were disavowed to whatever extent possible, but still they
were part of the record for use as evidence by plaintiffs.75
In North Carolina, the defendants attributed the shape of the
districts to a political purpose to concentrate Democrats in safe
districts. What easier way was there to concentrate Democrats than
to "pack" a district with African Americans-of whom over 95% of
those who registered and voted did so as Democrats? To counter
such claims of a political-as opposed to racial-motive, it was
especially important for us plaintiffs to have available experts to
demonstrate from the demographic data and otherwise that different
districts would have been drawn had race not been the primary
motive.
In terms of compactness-and geographical measures thereof
like "perimeter compactness" and "dispersion compactness"-North
Carolina's "bizarre" Twelfth District was in the bottom one percent
out of 435 districts nationally; the First District was close behind. The
defendants attempted to discount these embarrassing facts by
introducing an amorphous concept of "functional compactness"which focused on asserted similarities among individuals regardless of
where they resided. Not surprisingly, race was argued to be the most
vital factor in establishing "functional compactness." If this rationale
were accepted, the General Assembly could form a congressional
district by grouping African Americans from all over North Carolina
and nonetheless that district would be viewed as "compact." In that
relied on as circumstantial
event, lack of "compactness" could not be
76
evidence to establish a race-based motive.
The defendants not only disputed the predominant racial motive
for North Carolina's Twelfth and First Districts but also insisted that,
even if race-based, the two districts survived the test of "strict
This test requires a showing of a "compelling
scrutiny."
governmental interest" and of "narrow tailoring" to serve that
interest. Here again the availability of expert testimony was
75. In other states such as Georgia and Texas, the legislature in enacting racial
gerrymanders made revealing statements about their purpose. See Miller,515 U.S. at 90608 (describing the give and take between the Georgia General Assembly, the U.S.
Department of Justice, and the ACLU); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 960-61 (1996)
(discussing Texas's submission to the U.S. Department of Justice).
76. Carried to an extreme, "functional compactness" under this view means that a
black person with a white spouse in Durham would be deemed to be less "compact" with
that spouse than with another black person in Charlotte. Placing in the same district
predominantly black census blocks, wherever located, would also be permissible. This
type of "racial profiling" seems at odds with its denunciation in many other contexts.
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important because the defendants cited evidence of many years of
racial discrimination in North Carolina to justify creating these
districts. Moreover, the First District was explained as being in the
tradition of a predominantly black congressional district-the "Black
Second"-that had existed in eastern North Carolina near the end of
the nineteenth century. The Twelfth District was defended as having
followed generally the "Piedmont Crescent" across the center of the
State and also having followed the path of the North Carolina
Railroad-which had been built some 150 years ago. Fortunately, the
experts we obtained could point to demographic changes and
relocation of population that had occurred in recent years; describe
improving race relations, increased voting participation, and greater
office holding among African Americans; and show how each of the
two majority-black districts in the 1992 plan ignored the boundaries
of Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMAs) 77 and television, radio and
newspaper markets.
In connection with "strict scrutiny," probably the most
persuasive claim of compelling government interest was that North
Carolina had to obtain preclearance from the Civil Rights Division
and that the Civil Rights Division would not preclear a plan without
two majority-black districts. Of course, the Justice Department
"maximization" policy was later held to be illegal,' but in 1992 this
policy had been a major redistricting constraint for North Carolina
and many other states. Another claim of compelling state interest
was to avoid a possibly successful suit by the NAACP for failure by
the General Assembly to create a majority-black district that could
feasibly be drawn.79
After a week's trial, the three-judge court ruled against the
plaintiffs, one judge dissenting.80 The district court had concluded
that a predominant race-based motive existed and that all of the
plaintiffs-even though white-had standing because all were
registered voters in North Carolina. They also decided, however, that

77. The SMA is a concept used in connection with the census. Charlotte is in a
different SMA than either Durham or Greensboro and Winston-Salem. Similar
differences exist as to television markets-sometimes referred to as Dominant Market

Areas (DMAs)-radio markets, and newspaper circulation areas.
78. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997) (upholding the district court's
redistricting on the remand from Miller v. Johnson); Miller,515 U.S. at 921-22.
79. In this connection the three conditions of Thornburg v. Gingles came into play
because unless they can all be satisfied, liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), cannot be invoked. 478 U.S. 36,50 (1986).
80. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,417 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
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the two districts survived strict scrutiny. Once again we were
launched on a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court delayed in acting on our appeal while it
considered Shaw-type cases from Louisiana and Georgia-two states
8
where the redistricting plaintiffs had won at trial. In U.S. v. Hays,
the Louisiana plaintiffs lost the appeal on standing grounds, because
none of the plaintiffs had been registered voters of the challenged
congressional district. ' In Miller v. Johnson, 3 the defendants tried in
various ways to limit the scope of Shaw, but the Court reaffirmed the
prohibition against racial gerrymandering and rejected contentions
that Shaw was unclear and ambiguous.
At the same time that the Court decided Hays and Miller, it
noted probable jurisdiction in our case, as well as in a case in Texas in
which the lower court had invalidated the racial gerrymandering of
congressional districts in Dallas and Houston. In turn, our appeal was
heard immediately after that of the state of Texas and other
defendants in Bush v. Vera.84 That appeal apparently occurred
because, after a three-judge district court had held the Texas plan
unconstitutional, Governor Bush decided not to remand the plan to
the Texas legislature, which was then controlled by Democrats.
Our case, like Vera, produced a favorable outcome for the
plaintiffs. The Court recognized the predominant racial purpose of
the North Carolina plan and concluded that, if the Twelfth District,
which slithered from Durham to Gastonia, was designed to fulfill a
compelling interest, its boundaries did not match that claimed
purpose. 5 In short, the district would not have been drawn as it was
if its real purpose had been to ensure compliance with sections 2 and
5 of the Voting Rights Act. 86 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court termed "singularly unpersuasive" the State's claim that if
the Voting Rights Act required the State to draw two majority-black
districts, they could be drawn in any manner and anywhere the
legislature might choosey

81. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
82. The same principle was applied with respect to three of the five plaintiffs in Shaw
v. Hunt, because they did not live in the Twelfth District. Quite recently-on November
27, 2000-the Supreme Court relied on this principle in dismissing a redistricting suit filed
in Alabama. Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28,28 (2000) (per curiam).
83. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).

84. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
85. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973,1973c (1994).
87. Shaw, 861 F. Supp. at 416-17.
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During the oral argument, a question arose as to our standing.
Unfortunately, none of the plaintiffs resided in the First District, and
thus we apparently lacked standing to challenge that district. I
contended, however, that the various districts were all so
interconnected that voters in all congressional districts in North
Carolina were prejudiced by the "ripple effect" from the
gerrymandered First District. But we did have two plaintiffs who
resided in the portion of Durham County which lay within the
Twelfth District, and they provided the necessary standing as to that
district."'
NORTH CAROLINA'S 1997 REDISTRICTING PLAN

When we received news of a reversal, only a few months
remained before the 1996 elections. Therefore, we requested prompt
action by the General Assembly and by the governor to put a new
plan in place. Our logic was that because a violation of important
constitutional rights had continued over the preceding four years, it
was time for a change. To continue longer with use of a plan held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court was intolerable!
Furthermore, we submitted that a racially neutral plan could be
drawn rather easily, and we pointed out several models upon which to
draw.
The defendants responded that considerable time would be
needed to prepare a new plan and that the General Assembly should
be given ample opportunity to do so.89 We next sought an
extraordinary writ from the district court to require the General
Assembly to prepare a plan. Failing in that effort, we then tried
unsuccessfully to obtain a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court
to direct the district court to order the legislature to act. The ultimate
result was that the unconstitutional plan was used in the 1996
elections.'
The events in North Carolina contrast with those in Texas. In
Texas, thirteen out of more than thirty congressional districts were
88. Id. at 904. The clear lesson from this is to assemble enough plaintiffs at the outset
so that changes of residence, deaths, or redrawing of districts do not leave only plaintiffs
who lack standing.
89. The Redistricting Committee in the then Republican-controlled House of
Representatives did prepare a plan. The Democrat-controlled Senate took the position
that preparing a plan could not be accomplished in time for the November 1996 elections,
and it did nothing.
90. Lay persons have difficulty understanding how a redistricting plan can continue to
be used after being held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This lack of
understanding increases cynicism about the electoral process.
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redrawn in 1996 to eliminate racial gerrymanders. This was
accomplished within a time frame comparable to that available to the
legislature in North Carolina, which has only twelve congressional
districts. Thus, the Texas legislature demonstrated that North
Carolina's claim of potential electoral process disruption by
redistricting in 1996 was probably exaggerated. 1
When it became clear that a new plan would not be forthcoming
in 1996 for the election and that for a third time the unconstitutional
plan would be used, we sought to induce legislators to adopt a nongerrymandered plan for 1998. As far as we could determine,
however, the General Assembly wanted to get by with the fewest
changes in the 1992 plan that would still be accepted by the courts.
To try to forestall acceptance of a spurious claim about a need to
create a majority-black district to comply with the Voting Rights Act,
our related non-profit organization, Americans for the Defense of
Constitutional Rights, 92 offered a $1,000 prize for a design of the most
"geographically compact" district containing a majority of blacks.
The winning contestant proposed a district in which blacks barely
exceeded 50% of total population and which did not conform to
either the First or Twelfth Districts, as they had been drawn in the
1992 plan. 93 The contest provided additional evidence that majorityblack congressional districts in North Carolina had not been-and
tailored" to fulfill any claimed compelling
could not be---"narrowly
94
interest.
state
Just before an April 1, 1997 deadline prescribed by the district
court, a new redistricting plan was enacted. In this plan, Durham
County was removed from the Twelfth District. As a result, the
existing plaintiffs, all of whom resided in Durham, lost their
standing. 95 Just as in the 1992 plan, both the Twelfth and First
91. The Texas remedial plan provided for open primaries to be conducted on the day
of the general election in November 1996 and for a runoff between the two top candidates
if no one received a majority.
92. The five Shaw plaintiffs incorporated this North Carolina non-profit corporation
as a means for mobilizing the efforts of persons concerned with violations of equal
protection and for informing citizens of North Carolina and elsewhere about evils that
result from explicit or implicit use of racial classifications-especially in the electoral
process.
93. The winning plan would not have been politically acceptable to the General
Assembly because it tied Durham County to northeastern North Carolina and this would
apparently not have pleased African Americans in either area.
94. The contest results tended to indicate that a geographically compact majorityblack district in North Carolina would have to include black communities in Durham, if it
could be created at all.
95. For the five plaintiffs in Shaw, the plan provided full relief. Their county-
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Districts appeared to lack geographical compactness, although they
both were improvements on their predecessors. The First District
was majority-black in total population by a very narrow margin; the
Twelfth District was almost 47% African American, instead of 55%
as compared to the previous plan.
As the legislative record later revealed, the chairman of the
Senate Redistricting Committee apparently believed-and so advised
his colleagues-that Shaw applied only to the creation of majorityblack districts and that, accordingly, a district that did not reach 50%
black in population was not subject to the "analytically distinct" claim
first recognized by Shaw. According to this argument, the Twelfth
District was immune from attack and a license existed to base its
district lines on race.
When the district court which had decided Shaw considered the
adequacy of the 1997 plan as a remedy, the plaintiffs pointed out that
none of them had standing but that they believed the plan was
unconstitutional. Their argument was that such a great similarity
existed between the Twelfth District in the 1992 plan, and the "new"
district in the 1997 plan that the more recent version should be
viewed as racially motivated and the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Moreover, the obvious purpose of the 1997 plan was to assure
retention of incumbents who had been elected under the
unconstitutional 1992 plan; if this were allowed, persons with "dirty
hands" would retain their spoils. The district court ultimately
approved the 1997 plan, but only as a remedy for those parties who
had been victims of the original unconstitutional gerrymander. The
district court left open the constitutionality of the new plan for future
challenge by others who might have standing.
Martin Cromartie, a Tarboro lawyer, and several others from the
Tarboro area initiated a lawsuit to challenge the First District. 96
Thereafter, some other persons who resided in the 1997 plan's
Twelfth District joined in Cromartie's suit in order to challenge that
district. The suit was referred to a three-judge panel which already
had before it another case concerning North Carolina's
reapportionment and redistricting.97 After a hearing in late March
Durham County-was no longer split and they were placed in a district that was compact
and not drawn according to racial lines.
96. I represented Cromartie, whom I have known for almost half a century.
97. On July 3, 1996, a group of plaintiffs led by Jack Daly had filed a complaint,
challenging not only North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan, but also its
legislative reapportionment plan. Daly v. High, No. 97-CV-750-BO (E.D.N.C. filed July 3,
1996). Only one of the judges on the panel to which this case was assigned had been on
the panel that decided Shaw v. Hunt.
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1998, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment as to the Twelfth District and ruled that a trial should take
place as to the constitutionality of the First District.
To a majority of the three judges, it seemed clear from the
uncontested facts-such as the racial demographics and their relation
to district boundaries-that the "new" version of the Twelfth District
was predominantly race-based. Although the percentage of African
Americans in the district had been reduced from around 55% to
below 47%, that percentage was still much greater than the
percentage of African Americans in the state-around 22%-or the
percentage of African Americans in the six counties from which the
District had been created-below 30%. Moreover, in the 1997 plan,
the blacks who were in the 1992 plan's Twelfth District had been
retained in that District in a much higher percentage than whites had
been. 98
The district court concluded that to decide the constitutionality
of the First District would require a full trial, but that in the meantime
the legislature should redraw the Twelfth District. Both the district
court and the Supreme Court denied a defense-requested stay.
Therefore, in April 1998, the General Assembly enacted a new plan
which did not change the First District but modified the Twelfth
District and several contiguous districts.
Under this plan, the Twelfth District's black percentage was
reduced to around 33%; the number of counties directly affected by
that district was reduced from six to five; and, unlike the 1997 version,
one entire county was not split by the Twelfth District. Under the
1998 plan, the district was clearly more geographically compact than
its 1992 and 1997 predecessors.
The legislation enacting the 1998 plan 99 included a rather unique
proviso. According to that proviso, the 1998 plan would be in effect
not only in 1998, but also in later years. However, if the State
obtained reversal of the summary judgment entered by the District
Court, the 1997 plan would again go into effect.1" When the State
proceeded with its appeal, this proviso meant that in the event of
success therein, the Twelfth District would become less compact and
more racially gerrymandered in the year 2000 elections. Moreover, if
98. Over 90% of the African Americans who were in the Twelfth District under the
1997 plan had been in that district under the 1992 plan, while less than 50% of whites were
similarly retained.
99. Act of May 21, 1998, ch. 2. 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 2 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-201(a) (1999)).
100. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,545 n.1 (1999).
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the summary judgment for plaintiffs were set aside, a trial would be
required to determine whether the 1997 plan's Twelfth District could
be used in an election. In any event, if the State's appeal from the
summary judgment against the 1997 plan's Twelfth District was
successful, the 1998 plan's Twelfth District could not be used again
without new legislation. The uncertainty and confusion resulting
from this proviso inevitably raised the question: Why was it inserted?
Was it forthcoming as a suggestion from the Attorney General's
office or from the legislators who had spawned the 1997 plan? Were
the possible confusing consequences foreseen?
After elections in 1998 under the plan which the legislature had
enacted earlier that year, the State continued its appeal. Ultimately it
won a Supreme Court ruling that a trial was necessary as to whether a
predominant racial motive existed for the 1997 plan's Twelfth
District. 1 1 The comprehensive evidence before the three-judge court
led to a decision by a majority of the court in March 2000 to the effect
that the Twelfth District was predominantly race-based and could not
survive strict scrutiny and that the First District was race-based-as
its 1992 predecessor also had been-but that this district was
adequately justified by the compelling interest of compliance with the
Voting Rights Act.
The lower court denied a request for a stay, but the Supreme
Court granted the stay pending completion of the State's appeal.0 "
Subsequently, the plaintiffs made an unsuccessful motion for
summary affirmance before the end of the 1999 term, 1 3 and the case
was set for argument. A subsequent effort by the plaintiffs to obtain
summary affirmance was not granted.
The case had been remanded for trial to determine whether race
had been the predominant motive of the North Carolina General
Assembly in enacting the 1997 redistricting plan. When the case was
argued on November 27, 2000, the plaintiff-appellees relied on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which establishes "clear error"
as the standard for reviewing findings of fact by a lower court. This
rule also requires an appellate court to accept determinations as to
101. Id. at 541.
102. It seems ironic that a stay was denied in April 1997 when a summary judgment
was involved but was granted in 1999 when judgment had been entered for plaintiffs after
a full trial.
103. In the effort to obtain summary judgment as to the Twelfth District, the plaintiffs
did not proceed with an appeal as to the First District. Their thinking was that in view of
the Court's schedule prior to the end of the term, it would be impossible to obtain
consideration of an appeal by plaintiffs before the end of term, and that the defendants'
appeal would be held over for resolution at the same time as plaintiffs' appeal.
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credibility made by the factfinder. Our principal contention was that
the majority in the district court had considered voluminous
documentary evidence, heard extensive testimony, and then made
fact-supported findings as to the legislature's predominant motive.
Thus, under Rule 52(a), an appellate court-presumably even the
Supreme Court-was bound by those findings and could not
independently weigh the evidence.
The appellants asserted that the predominant motive of the
General Assembly in drawing the Twelfth District had been
political-create a Democratic district and to protect incumbent
Representative Melvin Watt. This argument was bolstered by the
circumstance that in North Carolina at least 95% of the African
Americans who register support Democratic candidates. Thus, if
47% of the population of a district is black, almost inevitably a
Democrat will be elected to Congress.1°4 Consequently, it can be
contended that the primary goal was to elect a Democrat by
segregating a number of Democrats-who just happen to be African
Americans.
A subsidiary argument made by the appellants was that
incumbent protection was an important political motive for the
General Assembly and that Congressman Watt, who had represented
the Twelfth District for many years, should be protected by having as
many African Americans as possible in the Twelfth District. One
possible flaw in this argument is suggested by the following question:
If the Twelfth District from which Congressman Watt was elected in
1992 was itself an unconstitutional racial gerrymander-as held in
Shaw v. Hunt-is the incumbent elected therefrom entitled to any
protection? 05
When this Article was initially drafted, the appeal was pending
before the Supreme Court. However, on April 18, 2001, the Supreme
Court in a 5 to 4 decision held that the district court had clearly erred
in finding that the 1997 boundaries of the Twelfth District were
According to Justice Breyer's
predominantly race-motivated."e
104. North Carolina has party primaries in which only members of that party and
independents may vote. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-59 (1999). By law, in the party primary
there will be a runoff unless the leading candidate has at least 40% of the votes cast. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-111 (1999). Under these circumstances, it is almost inevitable that a
district in which forty-seven percent of the population is African American will nominate
an African American as the Democratic candidate. In turn, the party nominee will receive
enough votes from white Democrats to assure his or her election.
105. In a sense such protection could be viewed as providing the incumbent with "the
fruit of the poisonous tree."
106. Easley v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452,1456 (2001).
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opinion for the Court, the issue in the appeal is "evidentiary" and the
burden of proof on the plaintiffs attacking the district is "a
demanding one."'1
Justice Breyer noted, "Caution is especially
appropriate in this case, where the State has articulated a legitimate
political explanation for its districting decision, and the voting
population is one in which race and political affiliation are highly
correlated."
The Court also prescribed this test: In a case such as this one
where majority-minority districts (or the approximate equivalent) are
at issue and where racial identification correlates highly with political
affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must
show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably
consistent with traditional districting principles. That party must also
show that those districting alternatives would have brought about
significantly greater racial balance.I0 8
Justice Thomas, writing for the four dissenters and relying on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), noted that, "The issue for this
Court is simply whether the District Court's factual finding-that
racial considerations did predominate-was clearly erroneous." 1 In
this connection, he called attention to the Twelfth District's lack of
geographic compactness, the testimony of the plaintiffs' chief expert,
and various other items of evidence. One such item was an e-mail
from Gerry Cohen, the drafter of the redistricting plans, to Senator
Roy Cooper who chaired the Senate Redistricting Committee, which
reported, "I have moved Greensboro Black community into the 12"
[District], and now need to take... 60,000 out of the 12" [District]."
Shaw v. Reno recognized an "analytically distinct" cause of
action and sought to prevent the development of American apartheid.
The principle of equal protection stated therein has not been
repudiated by Easley v. Cromartie. However, the Court's most recent
decision has the practical effect of severely curtailing cases brought to
enforce the Shaw prohibition of predominantly race-based
redistricting. Even where a race-based motive exists, Easley provides
107. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,928 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover,
the Court cautioned that courts must "exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating
claims that a state has drawn district lines on the basis of race." Id.
108. The Court fails to define what constitutes a "significantly greater racial balance."
For example, in the 1997 plan, the total population of the Twelfth District was 47%
African-American, and in the 1998 plan it was only 33%. The plan increases the
likelihood an African American will be elected to Congress but concentrates African
Americans in one district. Would this be "significantly greater racial balance?"
109. Easley, 121 S. Ct. at 1470-71 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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a reward for disguising that motive. Indeed, it seems an affront to
Shaw and to equal protection that the November 2000 election was
conducted in a Twelfth District that was more racially gerrymandered
than the 1998 Twelfth District.
The willingness of a majority of Supreme Court justices to
tolerate political-as distinguished from racial-gerrymandering
suggests some interesting questions. What if, after the Twelfth
District in the 1992 plan had been held unconstitutional as a racial
gerrymander, the North Carolina General Assembly had voiced the
view that it thoroughly approved of the "political" results of the
elections under the 1992 plan and, therefore, had reenacted the plan?
Would that district then be constitutional because it was motivated by
politics rather than race? Indeed, what if the legislature concluded
that certain candidates could be elected by reason of their race if they
were placed in suitably designed districts and further concluded that
for "political" reasons it would be desirable to have these candidates
Would districts drawn under those circumstances be
elected?
constitutional because of their "political" underpinning?
EPILOGUE

I had hoped that the Hunt v. Cromartie litigation would provide
an incentive for abandoning racial gerrymanders, rather than
disguising them. However, I suspect that now the effect of the case
Even so, I would suggest that the
will be the opposite.
gerrymandering problem might be solved if we heeded guidance
provided by Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 10
where he wrote: "The British experience in eradicating 'rotten
Parliamentary
boroughs' is interesting and enlightening.
representation is now based on districts of substantially equal
proportion, and periodic reapportionment is accomplished through
independent Boundary Commissions." In the United States, some
states have proceeded in a similar manner and have created or
authorized redistricting commissions for congressional redistricting or
Five states-New Jersey, Hawaii,
legislative reapportionment."'
commissions for
and Washington-have
Idaho, Montana,
congressional redistricting. To ensure some partisan balance, each
state provides that the majority leaders of both houses and a
representative of the minority party in both houses shall each choose
110. 377 U.S. 533,567 n.44 (1964).
111. See generallyJeffery C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75

TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997) (examining the potential uses of redistricting commissions).
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at least one member of the commission. In Idaho and New Jersey,
the state chairs of the states' two largest political parties also each
choose a member." Idaho's commission is comprised of an even
number of members," while in New Jersey, Hawaii, Idaho, and
Washington the appointed members of the commission-who are an
even number-choose an additional member to serve as chair of the
commission." 4 Each of these five states seeks to ensure the
commission's political independence by imposing limitations on
participation in electoral politics or lobbying before, during, and after
service on the commission. Six other states use independent
commissions to perform legislative reapportionment. 5 Yet at least
four states use commissions as a backup method of redistricting if the
state legislature fails to adopt redistricting plans." 6 In three statesIowa, Maine, and Vermont-redistricting commissions are used only
in a consultative capacity. 17
In Hawaii, Idaho, and New Jersey, a redistricting plan approved
by the independent commission requires no further approval and is
not subject to amendment. The plan becomes law upon filing with
the appropriate official. In Montana, a congressional redistricting
plan prepared by the commission becomes law upon filing with the
Secretary of State; but a legislative reapportionment plan must be
submitted to the legislature for comments." 8 After a thirty-day
period, the legislature returns the plan along with its recommendation
to the commission, which then must file a final revision with the
Secretary of State within thirty days. A redistricting plan approved
by the Washington redistricting commission must be submitted to the
state legislature, which by two-thirds vote of each house may make
amendments affecting no more than 2% of the population of each
district. The plan then becomes law.
In light of North Carolina's unhappy history with redistricting
during the 1990s, I have become convinced that creation of some type
of redistricting commission would be the best means for the state to
112. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. III, § 2.
113. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2.
114. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. III, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. II § 43(2).
115. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § § 8-10; ARK. CoNST. art. 8, § § 1, 3-4; COLO. CONST.
art. V, §§ 44,48; MO. CONST. art. III, § § 2,7,45; OHIO CONST. Art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST.
art. II, § 17.
116. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6-4.1-1 to 4.1-14 (1998); MISS.
CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A.
117. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3 and pt. 3, §1-A (1986); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 73
(1974).
118. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 12(3) and (4).
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deal with redistricting in the wake of the year 2000 census.
Legislators will undoubtedly protest that they are the elected
representatives of the people and should perform redistricting, rather
than have it performed by others. However, they fail to recognize
that in redistricting, where legislators have great potential selfinterest, it is preferable to have impartial persons make the decisions.
A constitutional amendment would be the best means for
In this way, greater
establishing an independent commission.
permanency would be assured for the commission than if it were
established by statute, which could subsequently be amended or
repealed. 9 However, such an amendment would be time-consuming
and the legislature might be hesitant to propose such an amendment.
Moreover, unlike some states, North Carolina has no initiative
procedure whereby voters can place a constitutional amendment
before the voters for their consideration. Nevertheless, there remains
the possibility of a deadlock in redistricting and, in desperation, the
General Assembly might decide as an alternative to create an
independent redistricting commission by statute or else to place on
the ballot a constitutional amendment concerning such commission.
If created, such a commission should have some provision for
partisan balance, such as the appointment of one member apiece by
the leaders of each major party in the House and Senate. Likewise,
the members of the commission should be persons who have not been
involved recently in the legislative process, either as legislators and
lobbyists, and who agree not to run for elective office or to lobby
within several years after their service on the commission.
Certain basic requirements would be prescribed for the
commission to use in preparing a plan. Those requirements would be
derived from the traditional neutral districting principles to which the
Supreme Court has referred in recent redistricting cases. Thus,
contiguousness, geographical compactness, and respect for the
boundaries of cities, counties, and other political subdivisions would
be mandated. In light of the State's egregious racial gerrymandering,
the commission should be prohibited from considering racial data in
drawing district boundaries, except to the extent required by federal
law. 120 Because of the high identification of African Americans with
119. Perhaps if the voice of the people were expressed through a constitutional
amendment, this circumstance would be given special weight in the future and legislators
would hesitate to abolish the commission.
120. Under the conditions prescribed by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 306, 350
(1986), the legislature may be under a statutory obligation to create majority-black
districts.
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the Democratic Party, the danger exists that racial gerrymandering
will be disguised as partisan gerrymandering. To avoid such issuesand for many other reasons-it would be wise to prohibit partisan
gerrymanders and to preclude consideration of political data
concerning voter registration and voting performance. Similarly,
since incumbent protection may be used as a means to allow
representatives who previously were the beneficiaries of racial and
partisan gerrymandering to retain their spoils, I would propose that
not be allowed to consider the residence of
the commission
121
incumbents.
The redistricting plan prepared by the independent commission
could be made final without further approval. A less drastic
alternative would provide that once prepared by the commission, a
plan could be submitted to the legislature and would take effect if not
disapproved within thirty days by a two-thirds vote of both the House
and the Senate. Amendments would not be permitted, and if
disapproval occurred by the required supermajorities in the
legislature, the plan would be returned to the commission to prepare
a new plan. The process would continue until a plan was approved.'2
On several occasions in the past, legislation to create an
independent redistricting commission has been proposed by members
of the General Assembly but has received no meaningful
consideration. During the current session of the North Carolina
General Assembly, which began in January 2001, bills have been
offered to create an independent redistricting commission by
constitutional amendment or by statute. 3
These bills, however, have not even received a hearing and have
no hope of passage. The population trends revealed by the 2000
census will apparently result in an additional congressional seat for
North Carolina and in a need to make major changes in legislative
and congressional districts. The failure of the General Assembly to
121. Under the 1992 plan, there were elections in North Carolina in which persons ran
successfully for Congress even though they did not reside in the district involved. Thus, an
incumbent would be free to run for Congress even though placed in a district where he or
she did not reside. This would not be true as to candidates for the state legislature.
122. Requiring an "up or down" vote on a redistricting plan provides a process that
avoids minor tinkering with a plan. This process seems to have worked well in some other
situations-such as with congressional approval for closing military installations.
123. H.R. 318, 2001 Leg., 2001-2001 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001), available at http://
www.ncleg.netlhtnil200lfbills/currentversion/house/hbil0318.full.html; S. 283, 2001 Leg.,
2001-2002 Reg. Session (N.C. 2001), available at http://www.ncleg.net/htmi2001
/bills/currentversionsenate/sbi10283.full.html; S. 285, 2001 Leg., 2001-2002 Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2001), available at http://www.ncleg.netlhtml2OOllbills/currentversion/senate/
sbi10285.full.html.
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even consider an independent redistricting commission probably will
lead to some major legislative battles over reapportionment and
redistricting plans for future elections. While the litigation as to these
plans will not likely have the same high profile that it did during the
1990s, some attacks in federal and state courts are not improbable.
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